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JONATHAN ROSS MATHEWS, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) ________ ) 
NO. 40530 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2012-6840 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Mathews requests that this Court grant review in this matter, which relates to 
the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in State v. Mathews, Docket Number 40503, 2013 
Unpublished Opinion No. 754 (November 19, 2013) ("Opinion"). In the Opinion, a 
unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals held that there was reasonable suspicion to 
extend a stop for a traffic violation in order to provide time for a drug dog to arrive at the 
scene. 
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Mr. Mathews argues that both the district court's and the Court of Appeals' 
determinations that there was reasonable suspicion to extend the stop is contrary to 
legal authority established by this Court in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013), 
where this Court held that a travel route alone is not suspicious unless the police officer 
is aware of particularized facts which establish that the travel route is suspicious. In this 
case, Officer Bingham assumed, without any facts, that Mr. Mathews was traveling in 
Idaho to avoid a successful drug interdiction route through the State of Utah. However, 
Officer Bingham's belief that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to avoid a section of Interstate 
80 in Utah, was not supported by any facts, a conclusion that directly contradicts the 
holding from Morgan. 
Even more troubling, and a reason for this Court to grant review, is the Court of 
Appeals' holding that a lack of an explanation for Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho 
reasonably functioned as the basis for Officer Bingham's belief that he was in Idaho to 
avoid a section of Interstate 80 in Utah. This runs afoul of the requirement that 
reasonable suspicion be based on articulable facts, because the holding allows for the 
absence of a fact to be the basis for establishing an affirmative fact. In other words, 
Officer Bingham failed to ask Mr. Mathews why he was in Idaho, Officer Bingham then 
made up his own explanation for Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho, and the Court of 
Appeals held that since Mr. Mathews did not provide an explanation for his presence in 
Idaho, Officer Bingham's belief that he was in Idaho to avoid a section of interstate 
highway in Utah was somehow supported by articulable facts. This eviscerates the 
requirement that reasonable suspicion be based on articulable facts and undermines 
the premise that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. 
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This Court should also grant review because many of the factors relied on by the 
district court and the Court of Appeals to determine that reasonable suspicion existed to 
extend the stop are factors which have been determined to be those associated with 
innocent non-suspicious behavior. For example, both courts found that Mr. Mathews' 
calm behavior and decision to look Officer Bingham in the eyes when asked if he was in 
the possession of controlled substances was suspicious. This conclusion runs contrary 
to numerous cases which hold that nervous behavior and actively averting eye contact 
with law enforcement is suspicious. As such, the district court and the Court of Appeals 
have unhinged reasonable suspicion determinations from prior legal authority and allow 
officers to make up reasons to seize people in order to search for evidence of criminal 
activity. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Officer Bingham pulled Mr. Mathews over for speeding. (R., p.9.) Officer 
Bingham asked Mr. Mathews to provide him his driver's license, registration, and proof 
of insurance. (R., p.9.) While Mr. Mathews was collecting these materials, Officer 
Bingham asked him where "he was coming from and going to." (R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews 
told Officer Bingham that he had driven from Kansas to Reno Nevada to gamble, and 
that he was on his return trip to Kansas. (R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews then told Officer 
Bingham that his proof of insurance was outdated and he continued to look for current 
proof of insurance. (R., p.76.) 
Officer Bingham and Mr. Mathews continued to converse while Mr. Mathews was 
looking for current proof of insurance. (R., p.76.) Mr. Mathews then told the Officer that 
he had spent the night in a hotel in Reno and gambled in a gas station and that he also 
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gambled at another establishment. (R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews then said he planned to 
drive from Idaho to Wyoming, then to Nebraska on his way home to Kansas. (R., p.9.) 
Officer Bingham asked Mr. Mathews if he had any marijuana, methamphetamine, or 
cocaine in his vehicle. (R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews removed his sunglasses, looked Officer 
Bingham in the eye, and stated that he did not have any of the foregoing substances. 
(R., p.9.) 
During this conversation, Officer Bingham noticed that Mr. Mathews had empty 
energy drink containers and food wrappers on the seat and floor of his car. (R., p.9.) 
Officer Bingham also noticed an atlas on the passenger's seat opened to the State of 
Idaho. (R., p.9.) 
After Mr. Mathews provided Officer Bingham his license, registration, and proof 
of insurance, Officer Bingham returned to his vehicle. (R., p.78.) Based on the 
foregoing information, Officer Bingham testified that at that point he abandoned the 
original reason for the stop and started an investigation for drug activity. (R., p.78; 
Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.99, L.1.) Officer Bingham started making phone calls to locate a 
canine officer. (R., pp.78-79.) A canine officer was eventually located and over sixteen 
minutes after abandoning the original reason for the stop, the drug dog alerted. 
(R., pp.9-10, 78-79.) A subsequent search of Mr. Mathews' trunk revealed over twenty-
four pounds of marijuana. (R., p.10.) 
Mr. Mathews was charged, by information, with trafficking in marijuana. 
(R., pp.29-30.) Mr. Mathews filed a motion to suppress based on a theory that Officer 
Bingham unreasonably extended the stop to afford the drug dog time to arrive at the 
scene. (R., pp.52-56.) The district court denied the motion to suppress because it 
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determined that the following four factors established reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Mathews was engaging in a drug related activity. (R., pp.67, 74-88.) First, 
Mathews' travel plans "were suspect" as he was not taking a direct route back to 
Kansas. (R., pp.84-85.) Second, Mr. Mathews took his sunglasses off and calmly 
looked into Officer Bingham's eyes when he denied having any contraband in his 
vehicle. (R., p.85.) Third, the food wrappers and energy drinks created a "lived in" 
appearance in the car. (R., p.84.) Fourth, Mr. Mathews was relying on a paper atlas as 
opposed to an electronic GPS system. (R., p.84.) 
There were various factors which were not discussed by the district court which 
weighed in favor of Mr. Mathews. Officer Bingham testified that Mr. Mathews did not 
to be under the influence of controlled substances. (Tr., p. 78, Ls.12-1 ) In fact, 
Officer Bingham testified that the thought that Mr. Mathews might have been under the 
influence of a controlled substance never even crossed his mind. (Tr., p.78, Ls.16-22.) 
Officer Bingham never testified that Mr. Mathews was not coming from or going to a 
location associated with drug use or sales. Officer Bingham did not receive a tip that 
Mr. Mathews was trafficking or using drugs. According to trial counsel, there was no 
"drug activity tip, [no] bloodshot eyes, [and no] fumbling for paperwork." (Tr., p.133, 
Ls.15-22.) The main reason Officer Bingham guessed that Mr. Mathews might be 
engaging in illegal activity was his personal belief that Mr. Mathews should have been 
taking a direct route back to Kansas. 
Mr. Mathews pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana and preserved his ability to 
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. (R., pp.113-114, 121, 124-
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125.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with 
three years fixed. (R., pp.133-138.) Mr. Mathews timely appealed. (R., pp.140-143.) 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether the existence of 
energy drinks and food wrappers contributed to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Mathews 
was engaged in the transportation of drugs. (Opinion, p.5.) In determining that 
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop, the Court of Appeals considered the 
fact that Mr. Mathews calmly looked the officer in the eyes when he denied the 
possession of contraband. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) The Court of Appeals also considered 
Mr. Mathews' circuitous travel route, explanation of gambling in Nevada, and the 
existence of a paper map as opposed to an electronic GPS system. (Opinion, pp.6-7.) 
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ISSUE 
Should review be granted, as the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming 
Mr. Mathews' Judgment of Conviction is inconsistent with a prior Idaho Supreme Court 
Opinion and prior Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Review Should Be Granted As The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming 
Mr. Mathews' Judgment Of Conviction Is Inconsistent With A Prior Idaho Supreme 
Court Opinion And Prior Idaho Court Of Appeals Opinion 
A. Introduction 
This Court should grant review because the holding in the Opinion is inconsistent 
with this Court's holding in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013), where this 
Court held that Morgan's decision to make four left hand turns and a police officer's 
belief that this travel pattern was a means to avoid law enforcement did not objectively 
establish a reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot. In this case, Officer Bingham 
determined that Mr. Mathews' decision to take a circuitous route through Idaho was 
suspicious because an interstate corridor in Utah provided Mr. Mathews a more direct 
route to his final destination and Officer Bingham had recently learned that the route 
through Utah was an area know for drug trafficking. 
The district court and the Court of Appeals both agreed that this was suspicious. 
However, both courts' determinations run afoul the holding in Morgan because 
Mr. Mathews provided Officer Bingham with no specific facts as to the reason why he 
was in Idaho. In other words, Officer Bingham's determination that Mr. Mathews' 
presence in Idaho was suspicious was based on Officer Bingham's beliefs and not 
based on any particularized facts indicating that Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho was a 
means to avoid a specific section of an interstate highway in Utah. 
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that, since there was no affirmative 
explanation for Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho, it was reasonable for the district court 
to conclude that he was in Idaho to avoid driving through a section of interstate highway 
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in Utah. This turns the requirement that reasonable suspicion be based on articulable 
facts on its head and results in a holding that the lack of facts can be the basis for a 
legal determination that reasonable suspicion exists. 
Additionally, this Court should accept review because the district court's and the 
Court of Appeals' determinations that factors such as a calm demeanor and presence in 
a low crime area were suspicious, run afoul of various cases which hold that such 
factors are inherently not suspicious. 
B. Standards 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing but, ultimately, 
decision of whether to grant a given petition within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered 
though. Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be 
considered in evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first 
impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for 
the Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
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I.AR. 118(b). Mr. Mathews argues that this Court should grant review because the 
district court's order denying the motion to suppress and Court of Appeals' Opinion are 
both inconsistent with precedent from this Court and the Court of Appeals. 
Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to 
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellate court defers to the 
district court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). An appellate court also gives 
deference to any implicit findings of fact that are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, an 
appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's application of constitutional principles to 
facts as found. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 485-486. 
C. Review Should Be Granted As The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming 
Mr. Mathews' Judgment Of Conviction Is Inconsistent With A Prior Idaho 
Supreme Court Opinion And Prior Idaho Court Of Appeals Opinion 
Mr. Mathews does not challenge the district court's factual findings in this appeal. 
As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts as found by the 
district court, the district court erred in denying Mr. Mathews' motion to suppress the 
State's evidence. Mr. Mathews submits that the district court's ruling denying his motion 
to suppress was not supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and 
that this Court should, therefore, vacate the district court's order denying the motion to 
suppress. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, 486 (2009). The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been 
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incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,810 (2009). 
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. at 811. 
Mr. Mathews recognizes that the United State Supreme Court has abandoned a 
reflexive exclusionary rule and now focuses on a cost benefit analysis which, among 
other things, focuses on the flagrancy of police misconduct. Davis v. U.S., 131 
S.Ct. 2419, 2427-2429 (2011 ). Mr. Mathews submits that he meets this standard 
as argued below, Officer Bingham's decision to extend the stop could have 
been justified had has asked more than general and questions 
Mr. Mathews' travel plans. And, in some sense has been awarded for his inadequate 
investigatory techniques. Moreover, Mr. Mathews raised his claims under both the 
United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. (R., p.52.) Pursuant to Idaho 
CONST. Art. I,§ 17, the remedy is suppression of the State's evidence. State v. Arregui, 
44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). 
Even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of reasonableness. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. This means that the 
detention must be both justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that originally justified the interference in the first place. Id. Limited 
detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable, articulable 
suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed, or is about 
to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be able to 
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point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires more 
than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion." Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). The question of 
whether an officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by 
examining the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, 
the detention. Id. Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its 
underlying justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983). In fact, an individual "may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Id. at 498. 
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. 
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005). While the purpose of a stop 
is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop and may evolve 
based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the detention must 
be carefully tailored to the underlying justification for the stop. Id. at 562-563. 
"Accordingly, where officers abandon the initial purpose of a routine traffic stop and 
extend it to allow for a drug dog search, the extension must be justified by a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012). 
"Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell 
within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior." State v. 
Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180 (Ct. App. 2004). 
In this case, Mr. Mathews does not challenge the validity of the initial stop for 
speeding. The issue on appeal is further narrowed because Officer Bingham testified 
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that he abandoned the speeding investigation when he returned to his vehicle. 
(Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.99, L.1.) In fact, the State conceded that "any delay in regards to the 
calling of the drug dogs was not done during a time in which [Officer Bingham] was still 
investigating the speeding ticket." (Tr., p.118, Ls.18-23.) As such, the narrow issue on 
appeal is whether Officer Bingham had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop in 
order to provide time for a drug dog to arrive at the scene and search 1 Mr. Mathews' 
car. Since, Officer Bingham began calling for drug dogs immediately after he returned 
to his vehicle (R., p.78), the only information relevant to the determination of whether 
Officer Bingham had reasonable suspicion to begin investigating for drug related activity 
is the information Officer Bingham 
This information consists of the 
during his first contact with Mr. Mathews. 
between Officer Bingham and Officer 
Bingham's observations of Mr. Mathews' vehicle. 
Based on this information, the district court found four general factors which it 
concluded justified Officer Bingham's decision to expand the purpose of the stop into an 
investigation for drug activity. However, there were other non-suspicious factors which 
were not analyzed by the district court which belie the conclusion that reasonable 
suspicion existed to extend the stop. Officer Bingham did not observe anything on the 
exterior of Mr. Mathews' car that was suspicious. (Tr., p.86, Ls.6-9.) He did not see 
anything inside Mr. Mathews' car associated with drugs. (Tr., p.87, L.25 - p.88, L.6.) 
Officer Bingham did not smell the order of marijuana, which Officer Bingham would 
have recognized. (Tr., p.87, Ls.19-24.) Officer Bingham didn't think Mr. Mathews was 
1 Mr. Mathews does not contend that the drug dog's sniff was a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
13 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Tr., p.78, Ls.12-15, p.88, Ls.7-13.) Officer 
Bingham did not testify that Mr. Mathews was either coming from or going to a drug 
trafficking destination. ( See generally, Tr., p.11-p.108.) According to trial counsel, there 
was no "drug activity tip, [no] bloodshot eyes, [and no] fumbling for paperwork." 
(Tr., p.133, Ls.15-22, p.86, Ls.1-5.) Officer Bingham testified that throughout their 
conversation Mr. Mathews was calm, confident, and did not display signs of 
nervousness. (Tr., p.61, Ls.15-19.) 
Additionally, one of, if not the most important, factors ignored by the district court 
and the Court of Appeals was that Mr. Mathews' was initially pulled over for speeding. 
(R., p.9.) This is important because three of the four factors relied on by the district 
court and two of the three factors relied on by the Court of Appeals to hold that there 
was reasonable suspicion to extend the stop were factors which related to Mr. Mathews' 
alleged pattern of avoiding law enforcement. Officer Bingham testified that existence of 
food wrappers, a paper map, and the use of long circuitous routes are suspicious 
because they are generally consistent with drug traffickers' efforts to avoid interactions 
with law enforcement. However, reliance on all of those factors for the inference that 
Mr. Mathews was trying to avoid interaction with law enforcement is belied by the fact 
that he was pulled over for speeding, which is one of the most likely means by which the 
average citizen interacts with law enforcement. 
Now turning to the factors the district court and the Court of Appeals considered 
objectively suspicious. The first factor relied on by both courts, Mr. Mathews' stated 
travel plans, should not be afforded much, if any, weight in the reasonable suspicion 
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analysis. The district court provided the following explanation supporting its conclusion 
that Mr. Mathews' travel plans were suspicious: 
When asked where he came from and what he was doing there, 
[Mr. Mathews] told [Officer Bingham] that he drove cross-country from 
Kansas to Reno, Nevada, to gamble at a gas station. When [Officer 
Bingham] asked Mathews where he was headed, [Mr. Mathews] said he 
was traveling to Kansas from Reno, via Cheyenne and Lincoln. [Officer 
Bingham] knew that the most direct route from Reno to Cheyenne was on 
Interstate 80 through Utah - a section of interstate that is well-known for 
being patrolled for drug trafficking and could compel a trafficker to go far 
out of his way to avoid detection there. 
(R., pp.84-85.) The foregoing analysis was based on Officer Bingham's testimony that 
he thought Mr. Mathews was intentionally avoiding the stretch of 1-80 which goes 
through Utah to avoid contact with law enforcement. (Tr., p.65, L.10 - p.71, L.18.) The 
Court of Appeals also thought Mr. Mathews travel plans were because 
failed to explain to Officer Bingham why he was in Idaho. (Opinion, p.6.) 
The district court's and the Court of Appeals' reliance on Mr. Mathews' travel 
plans as a factor which supports its conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed to 
extend the stop runs afoul this Court's recent holding in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 
(2013). In that case, a police officer observed Morgan take a series of four left turns. 
Id. at 111. The police officer concluded that Morgan's driving patter was an attempt by 
Morgan to avoid the officer, so the officer stopped Morgan. Id. The Idaho Supreme 
Court concluded the stop was unreasonable because "the officer provided no factual 
justification for" his "belief" Morgan was attempting to avoid him. Id. at 112. This Court 
went on to hold that "[a]bsent other circumstances, driving around the block on a Friday 
night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an investigatory 
stop." Id. In this case, Officer Bingham pulled over Mr. Mathews for speeding and 
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observed some common items in his car, i.e. a map and some garbage, made 
assumptions based on his personal belief that Mr. Mathews' was in Idaho avoid a 
stretch of Interstate 80 in Utah. Similar to the police officer in Morgan, Officer Bingham 
did not articulate any fact specific to Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho to support the 
conclusion that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to avoid law enforcement in Utah. On other 
words, Officer Bingham's determination that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho was based on 
his "belief" and not facts and is no different than the police officer's belief in Morgan that 
Morgan was trying to avoid him by taking four left hand turns. 
What is even more troubling is the Court of Appeals' conclusion that 
Mr. Mathews' decision to look Officer Bingham in the and deny possessing 
controlled substances combined with failure to provide a reason why he was in Idaho 
was enough for Officer Bingham to reasonably assume he was in Idaho to avoid a 
section of Interstate 80 in Utah. The Court of Appeals holding follows: 
While there are numerous innocent explanations for taking a circuitous 
route, [Mr. Mathews'] answers to the officer's queries neither gave an 
explanation nor even acknowledged that his location was far off his 
proclaimed course. This led the officer to suspect that the actual 
explanation might be that [Mr. Mathews] was avoiding a portion of 
Interstate 80 because it was known to be a drug interdiction zone. 
[Mr. Mathews] indirect, unexplained travel route, although not suspicious 
in isolation, was suspicious when combined with his odd behavior in 
response to the officer's question about drugs. 
(Opinion, p.6 (emphasis added).) According to the Court of Appeals, it was reasonable 
for Officer Bingham to believe, without any specific facts, that Mr. Mathews' presence in 
Idaho was suspicious because Mr. Mathews never volunteered a reason for being in 
Idaho. Again, in Morgan, this Court held that reasonable suspicion must be based on 
articulable facts. If Officer Bingham's suspicions were reasonably piqued by 
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Mr. Mathews' travel plans, it makes little sense that Officer Bingham did not ask 
Mr. Mathews why he was in Idaho. During cross-examination, Officer Bingham testified 
that he never asked Mr. Mathews if he had been to Idaho before. (Tr., p.93, Ls.22-24.) 
Officer Bingham then testified that he never asked Mr. Mathews if he had been to Twin 
Falls or if he was going to Twin Falls to watch base jumpers jump off Perrine Bridge, 
which he agreed is an innocent reason for young people to visit Twin Falls. (Tr., p.93, 
L.25 - p.94, L.6.) Since Officer Bingham had no idea why Mr. Mathews was in Idaho, 
his assumption that he was avoiding Utah was merely inchoate and unparticularized 
and, therefore, not a reasonable basis for the district court's finding Mr. Mathews' 
presence in Idaho was suspicious. Morgan, 1 Idaho 109; lNhite, 496 U.S. at 
However, Court of Appeals functionally disregarded that and concluded 
that reasonable suspicion can exist when a suspect fails to affirmatively volunteer a 
legitimate explanation for travel plans. 
Mr. Mathews' position is further supported by the lack of relevance between his 
travel plans through Idaho and his response to Officer Bingham's incriminating 
questions. Again, Morgan held that suspicion can only be inferred from a travel route if 
there is something suspicious about that travel route. Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. Here, 
Mr. Mathews' response to Officer Bingham's question, removing his sunglasses and 
calmly denying that he was in possession of contraband, has no relevance to 
Mr. Mathews' travel plans. Had Officer Bingham asked Mr. Mathews why he was in 
Idaho and Mr. Mathews indicated that he was trying to avoid Utah, he then might have 
had a fact to support his conclusion that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to avoid a 
successful drug interdiction corridor in Utah. Absent such a fact , Mr. Mathews' 
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presence in Idaho should not have been afforded much, if any, weight in the reasonable 
suspicion determination because Mr. Mathews' removal of his sunglasses had no 
bearing on his travel plans in Idaho. 
Another problem with this holding is that it also allows for a police officer to 
manufacture reasonable suspicion by avoiding asking detainees questions about their 
travel plans. As mentioned, above Officer Bingham could have easily asked 
Mr. Mathews why he was in Idaho if he was planning to return to Kansas. It is the lack 
of facts as to the answer of that hypothetical unasked question which the Court of 
Appeals held was partially the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals' holding in this case actually encourages police to engage in vague 
and general questioning so the officer can fill in the answers to non-asked 
questions themselves and use those made up narratives as the basis for reasonable 
suspicion. Regardless of Officer Bingham's intent in this matter, this is exactly what 
happened; Officer Bingham asked a few broad questions and without providing 
Mr. Mathews an opportunity to provide an innocent explanation for his travel route 
through Idaho and Officer Bingham then assumed that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to 
avoid a specific section of interstate highway in Utah. 
The courts' reliance on Mr. Mathews' travel plans as a factor to conclude that 
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop also runs contrary Idaho Court of 
Appeals precedent and, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow a court to find a 
person's presence suspicious no matter where that person was pulled over. In 
Danney, supra, the Court of Appeals held that one of the factors supporting the holding 
that there was reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop in order for a drug dog to 
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arrive was the fact that Danney was pulled over in an area known for drug trafficking. 
Danney, 153 Idaho 411; see a/so State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that one's presence in a high-crime area is an appropriate factor to use when 
determining whether it is reasonable to search for weapons). Here, the district court 
found that it was suspicious for Mr. Mathews to be present on a roadway which is not 
well known for drug trafficking. (R., pp.84-85.) Based on this logic, every person that 
gets pulled over either in an area known for drug trafficking or an area not known for 
drug trafficking would be considered a potential drug trafficker. Such a finding is 
patently unreasonable. 
district court and also found Mr. Mathews' decision to 
go to Nevada to a gas was somewhat suspicious because he 
could have gambled at a gas station in "'"'"0 '"" Nevada. (R., p.85, n.5; Opinion, pp.6-
7.) There could have been totally innocent explanations for Mr. Mathews to gamble in 
Reno, but Officer Bingham failed to ask enough questions for that fact alone to be 
suspicious. For example, Mr. Mathews could have had a friends or family that live in 
Reno. He might have sought a specific place to gamble because it supposedly had a 
higher win rate than his other options. Mr. Mathews did gamble at more than one 
establishment. (R., pp.9.) Mr. Mathews might have gambled at the first place lost then 
got lucky at the gas station and decided to stay there. He might have also wanted to 
visit Reno because it is "America's Biggest Little City." However, both courts agreed 
with Officer Bingham and just assumed that Mr. Mathews' reason for gambling in 
western Nevada was suspicious without any facts indicating the reason he was in 
western Nevada. Again, this runs afoul Morgan because there is no specific fact in the 
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record which makes Mr. Mathews' presence in western Nevada suspicious and the lack 
of a non-incriminating explanation for his presence in western Nevada is not an 
articulable fact which supports either court's reasonable suspicion finding. Morgan, 154 
Idaho at 109; White, 496 U.S. at 329. 
The second factor relied on by the district court and the Court of Appeals to 
determine there was reasonable suspicion to extend the stop was the fact that after 
Mr. Mathews was asked if he had contraband in his vehicle he calmly, and without any 
display of nervousness, removed his sunglass, looked Officer Bingham in the eye, and 
said that he did not have any controlled substances in his car. (R., p.85; Tr., p.61-
Ls.12-19.) 
The district court's reliance on this as a factor to support a finding of reasonable 
suspicion and is at odds with the relevant case law. For example, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor that may 
contribute to reasonable suspicion." State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 475-476 (Ct. App. 
2009). Moreover, in State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406 (Ct. App. 1994), the Court of 
Appeals held the fact that the defendant hid his face while speaking with an officer was 
a factor which objectively supported the conclusion that the officer had reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was engaging in criminal activity. Id. at 410. In State v. 
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490 (Ct. App. 2008), the defendant was asked by an officer if she 
had marijuana. Id. at. 494. The defendant then made eye contact with the officer and 
denied having any marijuana. Id. The officer then asked the defendant if she had any 
methamphetamine and the defendant "turned away, avoided eye contact, and did not 
answer." Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that a factor which supported the 
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determination that reasonable suspicion existed was the fact that the defendant's 
"demeanor changed visibly when asked whether there was methamphetamine in the car 
as compared to other drugs." Id. at 497. 
In this case, Mr. Mathews displayed behaviors which were the opposite of the 
defendant's in the foregoing cases and consistent with the behavior of an innocent 
individual. In Nevarez, the Court of Appeals held nervousness and evasive behavior is 
suspicious. Nevarez, 147 Idaho at 475-476. Here, Mr. Mathews was neither nervous 
nor evasive. (Tr., p.61, Ls.12-19.) In Troughton, it was held that hiding one's face from 
police is suspicious. Troughton, 126 Idaho 410. In this Mr. Mathews looked 
the officer directly in the exact opposite of hiding his face. (Tr., p.61, L.19-62, 
L.3.) In Grantham, suspicious behavior was found when the defendant made eye 
contact when asked about marijuana, but looked away when asked about 
methamphetamine. Grantham, 146 Idaho at 494-497. It is important to note, that the 
Grantham Court did not find it suspicious for the defendant to look the officer in the eye 
when asked about marijuana. Id. Suspicious behavior was only found when the 
defendant looked away from the officer when subsequently asked about 
methamphetamine. Id. Here, Mr. Mathews was not nervous and did not display any 
evasive behavior when he looked Officer Bingham in the eye and denied having drugs. 
As such, Mr. Mathews' behavior when asked incriminating questions was the opposite 
of behavior the Idaho Court of Appeals has held suspicious. 
A holding that Mr. Mathews' behavior was suspicious would create precedent 
where any reaction in response to an incriminating question by law enforcement would 
create suspicion. Thus, a bright-line rule allowing officers to detain a car until a drug 
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dog could "search" would be established so long as police ask an incriminating 
question. As argued above, Mr. Mathews' behavior was the opposite of the behavior in 
the foregoing cases which was determined suspicious. If both evasive behavior or the 
lack of evasive behavior can be construed as suspicious then every time a person is 
asked an incriminating question by law enforcement the response would always be 
construed as suspicious. The unreasonableness of such a holding would be 
compounded by the district court's conclusion, supra, that being present in an area not 
known for drug trafficking is suspicious. Such a double sided rule would run afoul the 
rule which precludes suspicion to be found for conduct that can be described as normal 
behavior. Roe, 140 Idaho 180. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the foregoing argument, and pointed to 
some federal cases where the opposite factors were presented and then held that the 
specific finding that a factor is suspicious or not suspicious is not important because the 
rule being applied is that observations that appear inconsistent with an individual's story 
indicate that the story may be untrue. (Opinion, p.6.) While Mr. Mathews generally 
agrees with the Court of Appeals, there are some factors, such as a lack of 
nervousness and evasion, which are generally factors that cut against a holding that 
reasonable suspicion existed. Moreover, in the context of this case, Mr. Mathews' calm 
behavior in combination a lack of facts indicating he was using drugs, and the fact he 
was pulled over for speeding, were not suspicious. Moreover, district court's and the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that Mr. Mathews' calm behavior was suspicious because 
it seemed rehearsed or a "staged performance" (Opinion, p.5) is at odds with both 
courts' conclusion that his lack of an explanation for his circuitous route through Idaho 
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and decision gamble in a gas station in western Nevada was suspicious. 
(Opinion, pp.6-7.) If Mr. Mathews' response to Officer Bingham's incriminating 
questions were suspicious because they were so well rehearsed, then it defies logic to 
conclude that his lack of a rehearsed answer to basic questions were suspicious. Either 
Mr. Mathews was a calm well rehearsed drug trafficker or he was not. But the narrative 
provided by Officer Bingham and accepted by both the district court and the Court of 
Appeals considered him well rehearsed for the finding of suspicion as to one fact and 
his lack of rehearsed answers to another set of questions suspicious. 
The third factor identified by the district court was the food wrappers and the 
energy drinks which, according to the court, created a "lived in" look indicating that 
Mr. Mathews was in a hurry. (R, p.84.) The fourth factor identified by the district court 
was the map of Idaho, which was associated with drug activity as drug traffickers prefer 
paper maps because GPS systems require destination information. (R., p.84.) 
As a preliminary note, the Court of Appeals did not analyze the third factor, and 
implicitly held that the presence of food wrappers and empty energy drinks in 
Mr. Mathews' car was not suspicious and consistent with his claim that he was on a 
long distance road trip. (Opinion, p.5.) 
The district court's reliance on these two factors is misplaced as neither of them 
were unique to Mr. Mathews and they were entirely consistent with his statement that 
he was on a long road trip. Moreover, there is nothing unusual or suspicious about a 
person on a long road trip having a messy car and an open map. There is persuasive 
authority holding as such. For example, in overturning a court's finding of reasonable 
suspicion, the 10th Circuit employed the following rationale in determining that the 
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presence of open maps and fast food wrappers are not factors which give rise to 
reasonable suspicion: 
The district court also concluded that the presence of fast-food 
wrappers and open maps in the passenger compartment contributed to a 
finding that reasonable suspicion existed. [The defendant] informed the 
trooper of his travel itinerary-a cross-country trip through parts of the 
country he had not seen before. The presence of open maps in the 
passenger compartment is not only consistent with his explanation, but is 
entirely consistent with innocent travel such that, in the absence of 
contradictory information, it cannot reasonably be said to give rise to 
suspicion of criminal activity. See Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485,495 (3d 
Cir.1995). Remnants from fast-food restaurants can probably be found on 
the floor of many cars traveling the interstate highways, including many 
traveling eastbound on Interstate 70. See id. at 496 (Fast-food wrappers 
"have become ubiquitous in modern interstate travel and do not serve to 
separate the suspicious from the innocent traveler."). The possession of 
open maps and the vestiges of fast-food meals describes a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers, and any suspicion associated 
with these items is virtually nonexistent. 
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also U.S. v. 
Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1283 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that the "presence of a road 
atlas and fast food wrappers" in defendants' vehicle, which were consistent with the 
defendant's explanation of traveling on a long road trip, are not factors which contribute 
to a finding of reasonable suspicion); State v. Richmond, 133 S.W.3d 576,580-581 (Mo. 
App. S.D., 2004) (holding that defendant's nervousness, food containers, beverage 
containers, an atlas in the passenger compartment, and the defendant's claim he was 
traveling from Los Angeles to Michigan, did not support the officer's belief that criminal 
activity was afoot); Meraz-Lopez v. State, 92 Ark. App. 157, 160-161 (Ark. App. 2005) 
(holding that nervousness combined with "[t]he presence of a brand new cellular 
telephone, new atlases, fast food, and energy drinks scattered in the front are 
seemingly innocent."). During cross-examination, Officer Bingham even testified that 
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energy drinks, food wrappers and water bottles are quite common possessions for 
innocent individuals driving across the country. (Tr., p.92, L.19 p.92, L.7.) 
Additionally, the credibility of Officer Bingham's assertion that drug traffickers 
prefer paper maps over GPS systems is suspect. While Officer Bingham did testify that 
in his training drug traffickers prefer paper maps (Tr., p.22, L.9 p.23, L.10), he never 
provided any information indicating that in his experience he has arrested any drug 
traffickers using paper maps to navigate. As such, Officer Bingham never testified that 
he had first-hand experience with arresting drug traffickers that use paper maps. Officer 
Bingham did testify that "a lot of people use GPS" systems. (Tr., p.22, Ls.3-9.) 
However, the mere assertion that a lot of use GPS systems not distinguish 
Mr. Mathews' driving behavior from the the population because it does not 
establish that the majority of the population uses GPS systems. As such, Officer 
Bingham's testimony that a lot of people use GPS systems did not go far enough to 
establish that people on long road trips in possession of paper maps are drug 
traffickers. 
As mentioned above, the conclusion that Mr. Mathews' food wrappers travel 
plans were suspicions is further belied when Officer Bingham's rationale is analyzed. 
Officer Bingham testified that the energy drinks and the food wrappers were suspicious 
because they indicate that Mr. Mathews was in a hurry to get somewhere and drug 
traffickers try to hurry when traveling to reduce the odds of interacting with law 
enforcement. (Tr., p.103, L.8 - p.104, L.10.) If Mr. Mathews was in a hurry to get home, 
it makes little sense for him to take a detour from the direct route to Kansas. The logic 
of Officer Bingham breaks down further because the original reason for the stop was 
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speeding. If a drug trafficker is willing to take long detours and avoid stopping to eat to 
avoid interactions with law enforcement, it makes little sense for that person to 
undermine all those precautions by breaking a simple law like speeding which 
significantly increases the odds of interacting with law enforcement. See Nevarez, 14 7 
Idaho at 475-476. (holding that driving well below the speed limit is suspicious because 
it is a means to avoid contact with law enforcement). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court and the Court of 
Appeals' erred when they determined that reasonable suspicion existed to extend 
Mr. Mathews' stop. Mr. Mathews' behavior when interacting with Officer Bingham was 
normal behavior. The items located in Mr. Mathews' car were normal and consistent 
with his travel plans. Moreover, the factors relied on by the district court and the Court 
of Appeals are all internally inconsistent. For the purposes of finding the that paper 
atlas, the food wrappers, and Mr. Mathews' travel plans were suspicious it was held that 
those factors indicated that Mr. Mathews' was avoiding law enforcement. However, that 
determination is undermined by the fact that Mr. Mathews was pulled over speeding and 
was clearly not concerned about avoiding law enforcement. The other major factor 
considered suspicious was Mr. Mathews' "rehearsed" response to Officer Bingham's 
incriminating questions. However, that factor is inconsistent with the finding that it was 
suspicious for Mr. Mathews' failure to provide a clear explanation as to his activities in 
Nevada. If Mr. Mathews was a rehearsed drug trafficker, then he would have also had 
a rehearsed set of answer as to his travel plans. Furthermore, it would be easier for 
Mr. Mathews to have a set of rehearsed travel plans than to act rehearsed when 
speaking with law enforcement. As such, there district court and the court of Appeals 
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erred when they determined that reasonable suspicion existed to extend the in 
order for a drug dog to arrive at the scene. 
In sum, this Court should grant review because both the district court and the 
Court of Appeals' holdings in this matter are inconsistent with this Court's holding in 
Morgan, supra. Additionally, the Court of Appeals has held that it was reasonable for 
Officer Bingham to make up an incriminating reason why Mr. Mathews' was in Idaho 
and then held that the Officer's belief was reasonable because Mr. Mathews had not 
provided him with an explanation for being in Idaho. Such a holding abrogates the 
constitutional standard that for suspicion to be deemed reasonable it must be supported 
by articulable facts. Additionally, the Court of Appeals holding in this matter is 
inconsistent with prior Court of Appeals precedent which holds that a calm is 
not suspicious and presence in a high crime area is suspicious. As such, every factor 
associated with a stop can be used to establish reasonable suspicion, which unhinges 
that legal determination from case law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mathews respectfully requests that this Court grant review. In the event this 
Court grants review, Mr. Mathews respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
district court's order denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 11 th day of March, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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